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EFFECTS OF RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS: CAN THEY INCLUDE HIGHER LEVELS OF
SATISFACTION FOR UNION WORKERS?
Steven Lance Popejoy, University of Central Missouri
This paper reviews theories and evidence on the effect of “right-to-work” laws on union members’ satisfaction with their
unions. With the increase of right-to-work activity at the state level, and with federal right-to-work legislation pending in
Congress, this has returned as an important political issue. Following a brief review of how the hypotheses of “taste,”
“free-rider,” and “bargaining power” can influence various effects of right-to-work laws, the idea of utility maximization
paired with measures of union satisfaction is explored to show theoretical evidence that greater levels of union
satisfaction could exist in right-to-work states than exist in non-right-to-work states. Arguments for both positive and
negative effects are compared. The author proposes that, as a future area of research, empirical tests be performed that
combine the concept of simultaneous equations with recently developed measures of union satisfaction.
This paper attempts to show from a theoretical
perspective how this scenario would likely occur, as well as
present a balanced view of the relevant arguments, both pro
and con. Through analysis of various hypotheses, it is hoped
that an increased understanding of RTW laws in general, and
union satisfaction in particular, will result.

INTRODUCTION
Since passage of the initial right-to-work (RTW) law by
the State of Florida in 1943, followed subsequently by
validating federal legislation as part of the Taft-Hartley Act
of 1947 (29 U.S.C. Sections 141 et seq.), much controversy
has been generated over the effects of such a law on the
union movement. Twenty-three states presently have such
legislation in one form or another (see Table 1), including
Indiana, whose law applies only to school employees (Neal,
2010), and numerous studies have been performed to
determine whether RTW laws have acted as a help or a
hindrance to various aspects of unionism. Inquiry into the
effects of RTW legislation has touched areas as diverse as
membership levels, union services, strikes, union militancy,
and wage levels (for a comprehensive review of right-towork and its effects, see Moore, 1998, and Moore and
Newman, 1985). However, no study has investigated its
relationship to union satisfaction: Specifically, are union
members in a right-to-work state more, or less, satisfied with
the performance of their union than union members in a nonright-to-work state?
Over the past several decades, studies on union
satisfaction have produced few significant results. However,
research by Fiorito, Gallagher and Fukami (1988) provides a
viable framework for analyzing union satisfaction, and in
this study an attempt is made to apply its underlying theory
to the right-to-work controversy. A current view shared by
many in organized labor is that RTW laws are detrimental to
the union movement. By not requiring all members of a
bargaining unit to join the union, an erosion of solidarity and
bargaining power occurs. Additionally, the existence of
“free riders” in the system is generally thought to increase
the organizing and maintenance costs of the union. Taking
all of this into consideration, is it possible that union
members could still be more satisfied with their union’s
performance in a right-to-work state than in its “unionfriendly” counterpart? Contemporary theory seems to
indicate that the answer may be yes.

BACKGROUND ON THE RIGHT-TO-WORK
DEBATE
Prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act (also known
as the Labor Management Relations Act), employers and
unions could lawfully agree to various forms of union
security. A union security agreement is essentially a
provision of the union contract that describes the obligations
of the employees to support the union. Throughout labor’s
history, these agreements have been highly valued by
organized labor and effectively despised by employers. To a
degree, they represent a tool of preservation to unions, and
typically have existed in the following forms:
1.

2.

3.

4.

Closed Shop – Makes union membership a
pre-condition of hiring, and continued
employment subject to retaining that
membership.
Union Shop – Allows non-members to be
hired as long as they become members within
a specified time frame, usually 30 or 60 days.
Preferential Shop (or Union Shop with
Preferential Hiring) – Specifies that union
members be given precedence over other
applicants for job vacancies. In some
occupations, such as longshore, shipping and
construction, where job assignments are
allocated through a hiring hall, preferential
hiring may amount to a closed shop.
Agency Shop – Allows non-members to be
hired without joining the union as long as he
or she pays the equivalent of initiation fees and
periodic dues.
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Maintenance of Membership – Requires that
all employees whose dues are being deducted
from earnings at the time the agreement takes
effect shall continue to have dues deducted for
the duration of the agreement and that dues

shall be deducted from the earnings of all
employees who are hired on or after the
effective date of the agreement (Hansen,
Jackson and Miller, 1982: 122).

TABLE 1
State Right-to-Work Laws, as of January 1, 2010

STATE
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Louisiana
Mississippi
Nebraska
Nevada
North Carolina
North Dakota
Oklahoma
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Wyoming

YEAR CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT ADOPTED

YEAR STATUTE ENACTED
1953
1947
1947
1943
1947
1985
1956-1965 (repealed)
1995 (school employees)
1947
1975
1976
1954
1947
1951
1947
1947
2001
1954
1947
1947
1993
1955
1947
1963

1946
1944
1944

1958
1960
1946
1952
1948
2001
1946

Source: Employment Standards Administration/U.S. Department of Labor

8(b)(2), subject to clearly defined specifications (Keller,
1956:17). The controversy over right-to-work stems from
section 14(b), which expressly affirms the right of each state
(and/or territory) to prohibit compulsory unionism (and thus
create the right to work):

Of course, the absence of any form of union security
agreement is referred to as an “open shop,” signifying that
any worker is eligible for hire, whether a union member or
not. (The terms “closed shop” and “open shop” were coined
by the National Association of Manufacturers during its
1903 convention, to differentiate among employers who
“closed off” hiring to only union members, and those who
“opened up” the hiring process to all workers. The open
shop was an important plank in its labor platform during the
coming election year (Shott, 1956: 12).)
It is the ideology behind the union security agreement
that is at the heart of the right-to-work debate. How much
authority does the federal government grant to unions that
would allow them to compel membership? Under TaftHartley, Congress outlawed in its entirety the closed shop
form of union security. However, the union shop and other
derivative forms are sanctioned in sections 8(a)(3) and

Nothing in this Act shall be construed as
authorizing the execution or application of
agreements requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment in any
State or Territory in which such execution or
application is prohibited by State or Territorial law
(29 U.S.C. Section 164).
Thus, in states where some form of right-to-work has
been passed, section 14(b) allows state law to control over
federal law regarding sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2), and
90
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challenged by local labor unions, with the Oklahoma
Supreme Court upholding both laws in December of 2003
(National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, 2004).
The judicial support of the RTW laws created momentum in
other parts of the country, including Pennsylvania, Indiana,
Missouri and Michigan. Currently, right-to-work legislation
has been proposed in 2010 in Indiana (House Bill 1011),
where right-to-work had been repealed in 1965 following
nine years of coverage (Bauer, 2010). In Pennsylvania,
several bills (including House Bill 50) dealing with right-towork were proposed in 2009, and are currently being
considered by the House Committee on Labor Relations
(Deyo, 2010; Boehm, 2010). It is important to note that
much of the current state activity is being conducted in the
pro-union northeastern region of the United States, where
RTW legislation has been rare. Conversely, it is interesting
to note that in Colorado, where the Rocky Mountain region
has been friendlier to RTW proponents, a right-to-work
proposal was soundly defeated in 2008 (Rosa, 2008).
While right-to-work activity has predominantly been at
the state level throughout its history, there is current interest
at the national level (National Right to Work Committee,
2010). House Bill H.R. 4107, the National Right-to-Work
Act, was introduced in Congress in November of 2009, and
at present has been referred to a House Subcommittee for
consideration. The NRTWA would amend both the National
Labor Relations (Wagner) Act and the Railway Labor Act
by repealing those provisions that permit employers to
require employees to join a union as a condition of
employment. If passed, this would represent the first
significant changes to U.S. labor law in over fifty years.

compulsory unionism will be banned to the degree specified
by state law. In actuality, section 14(b) merely validates
judicial construction of the National Labor Relations
(Wagner) Act (29 U.S.C. Sections 151 et seq.). The U. S.
Supreme Court had long held prior to 1947 that sections 8(3)
and 10(a) permitted the states to declare compulsory union
agreements invalid; section 14(b) simply restated this
principle as statutory law (Keller, 1956:18).
As one might expect, the union movement has never
embraced the concept of 14(b). Many in the union camp
called right-to-work laws a “campaign for the weakening of
trade unions” (Shott, 1956: 1). Other comments referred to
RTW as “part of an overall anti-union package” (American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations, 1958: 27), a “device which can be used to
harass unions” (AFL and CIO: 37), and “the handiwork of
reactionary employers….” (United Steelworkers of America,
1958: 7). As suggested by these comments, the debate is an
emotional one. While proponents of right-to-work speak in
terms of freedom of choice and freedom of association,
unions counter with the “free-rider” problem: The inherent
unfairness of allowing non-members to receive the benefits
of union membership without having to join the union, at the
expense of their fellow workers who do belong to the union.
This problem arises in a right-to-work state where the
open shop controls. Workers will be hired and, in a
unionized workplace, will decide on whether to join the
union. Under federal law (the Wagner Act), the union will
be the exclusive bargaining agent for the entire bargaining
unit, members and non-members alike. Whatever union
wages and benefits are negotiated for the bargaining unit
will apply to all employees. Those who do not join the
union will receive the same benefits as those who do, even
though they pay no initiation fees or dues.
Unions firmly believe that all employees should pay a
proportionate share of the union’s costs in negotiating
benefits that will be received by all, and those who don’t pay
are shirking their responsibilities. The emotion of the issue
is reflected in a United Steelworkers of America booklet,
which pointed out that free riders “may be said to indulge in
a working class variety of tax dodging” (United
Steelworkers of America, 1958: 28, quoting Myers, 1943).
Following the passage of Taft-Hartley in 1947, a flurry
of activity occurred as states acted on section 14(b), creating
right-to-work status through either statutory enactment or
constitutional amendment, or both. Currently all of the
states in the Deep South and a number of states in the
Midwest, Rocky Mountain and Plains areas have right-towork laws, while the typically pro-union Northeastern
region has none. While activity in the right-to-work arena
was minimal during the 1990s, the previous decade has
brought the topic back to the forefront of the labor
movement. Oklahoma joined the ranks of RTW states in
2001, the first state to enact such legislation since Texas in
1993. Both the Oklahoma statute and constitutional
amendment (also enacted in 2001) were immediately

EFFECTS OF RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS
Research involving right-to-work laws and their
implications for unionization has become increasingly
sophisticated over the years. Early studies involving the
RTW issue were primarily theoretical or impressionistic in
nature and evoked widely varying opinions. Inquiry by
Meyers (1955) reached the conclusion that a right-to-work
statute was purely symbolic in nature, and created minimal
effect upon the extent of unionization (see also Kuhlman,
1955; Witney, 1958).
That claim was rebutted by Kuhn (1961), who surmised
that RTW laws created a substantial obstruction to union
growth and strength, but could find no tangible evidence
(1961: 594). Glasgow (1967), in turn, pointed out that the
bulk of evidence suggests that unions existing in an RTW
state should experience a significant decrease in
membership, as well as a decline in union income and an
increase in per-member union service costs.
In the mid-1970’s, the controversy developed an
empirical nature, encompassing debate not only as to the
effects of RTW laws, but also to the analytical procedures
used. Research tended to focus on the consequences of
RTW laws in areas such as membership levels, wages, the
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correlation to indicate that a significant effect upon
membership does indeed exist. Their reasoning suggests
that RTW laws create a free-rider problem (thus the “freerider hypothesis”) by allowing nonunion members to avail
themselves of union services, thereby increasing union
organizing and maintenance costs. Such an increase
(reflected in the equation through the cost variable) would
have the effect of restraining the supply of union services,
thus decreasing the equilibrium level of unionism (see also
Zax and Ichniowski, 1991; Chaison and Dhavale, 1992;
Davis and Huston, 1993; and Sobel, 1995, for further
support of the free-rider hypothesis).
The inconsistency in the interpretation of the above
finding was addressed by Wessels (1981), Farber (1984),
and Moore and Newman (1985) as a flaw in the single
equation model. Citing research by Palomba and Palomba
(1971), Moore and Newman pointed out that bias exists in
the form of reverse causality: The extent of unionism is as
likely to be a factor in the passage of an RTW law as an
RTW law is likely to affect the extent of unionism (see also
Moore, Newman and Thomas, 1974). Put another way,
highly unionized states are less likely to pass right-to-work
legislation than lightly-unionized states. To compensate for
such bias, it is necessary to estimate a simultaneous
equations model that includes both union membership and
RTW status as endogenous variables.
Where such an adjustment has been made, the RTW
variable generally will no longer have a significant effect
upon union membership (Moore and Newman, 1985; Farber,
1984; and Wessels, 1981). However, it is interesting to note
that even with simultaneous equations, Warren and Strauss
(1979) still obtained a significant effect in the relationship.
A third explanation, the “bargaining power hypothesis,”
suggests that by preventing unions from requiring universal
membership, RTW laws directly weaken the bargaining
power of unions (Moore and Newman, 1985: 574-575). In
other words, diminished bargaining power leads to
diminished benefits; diminished benefits dampen workers’
attraction to unionism, thereby decreasing the equilibrium
level of unionism (with the RTW effect evident in the unionnonunion wage differential).
The three hypotheses outlined above reflect the
complexity of right-to-work issue (see, e.g., Moore, 1998:
449-450). Under the taste hypothesis, repeal of section
14(b) would have no significant effect on union membership
in right-to-work states. Under both the free-rider and
bargaining power hypotheses, a repeal of 14(b) would lead
to an increase in union membership, while an expansion of
14(b) would decrease union membership (Delaney, 1998:
429). This is in part responsible for the wide variation in
findings that have occurred over the past thirty years (see
Table 2 for a comprehensive summary), and is also
indicative of the frustration that has resulted from
unanswered questions.

union-nonunion wage differential, union militancy, strikes,
and organizing success. The first three items are of
particular importance to this study, which is loosely based
on the concept of demand and supply of union services.
Membership Level Effects
In the initial studies regarding the effects of RTW laws
on union membership levels, empirical models often utilized
demand and supply analysis, relating membership levels to
various independent variables that should influence the
demand for (Ud) or supply of (Us) union services (see
Ashenfelter and Pencavel, 1969; Pencavel, 1971; see also
Moore and Newman, 1985). As an example:
Ud = Ud (p, w, d, np, t)
Us = Us (p, c, g)
Where,
p = Price of membership
w = Wage rate (proxy for wealth)
d = Union/nonunion wage differential
np = Nonpecuniary union benefits (e.g., risk of
accident)
t = Tastes and preferences
c = Costs of organizing/providing services
g = Goals of the union (e.g., maximizing income,
maximizing membership levels)
The extent of unionism (U) will be determined by finding
the equilibrium between the demand for and the supply of
union services:
U = U d = Us
In using such a model (which assumes an RTW variable
to be exogenous to the system), Lumsden and Peterson
(1975) concluded that although a right-to-work state
typically had a smaller percentage of the work force
unionized, this was due to the tastes and preferences of the
population, and not an effect of the RTW law. The so-called
“taste hypothesis” suggests that RTW laws do not have an
independent effect on Ud, Us, or U, but simply represent
underlying hostile attitudes, which are responsible for any
decrease in the equilibrium level of unionism. Right-towork status is essentially symbolic in nature, and generally
is found only in states where anti-union sentiment exists.
Similar results (i.e., a negative correlation between
union membership and RTW status) have been obtained in
other studies, but the interpretation of such results has
varied. Moore and Newman (1975), Wessels (1981) and
Farber (1984) agreed with the Lumsden-Peterson conclusion
that the effects of the RTW laws appear to be insignificant,
essentially a reflection for the “tastes” of unionism, but
Warren and Strauss (1979) perceived the negative
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TABLE 2
Effect of Right-to-Work Laws on Membership
STUDY
Lumsden & Peterson,
1975
Moore & Newman, 1975

EFFECT OF RTW LAW
No Effect

Wessels, 1981

No Effect

Farber, 1984

No Effect

Warren & Strauss, 1979

Negative Effect

Moore & Newman, 1985

Negative Effect

No Effect

RATIONALE
Taste Hypothesis makes
RTW symbolic
Taste Hypothesis makes
RTW symbolic
Taste Hypothesis makes
RTW symbolic
Taste Hypothesis makes
RTW symbolic
Due to Free Rider
Hypothesis
Due to Bargaining Power
Hypothesis

Table 3 for a comprehensive summary). A general
conclusion is that RTW laws have no lasting impact on
union wages, nonunion wages, or average wages in either
the public sector or the private sector (Moore, 1998).

Wage Effects
Similar analyses, utilizing the various hypotheses, have
been applied to test other RTW effects, such as the
relationship between RTW laws and union wages;
significance generally depends upon whether the RTW
variable is treated endogenously or exogenously. Using an
exogenous interpretation, Carroll (1983) found that RTW
status had a significant negative effect upon union wages,
attributing it to a lower equilibrium level of unionization and
subsequent weaker union bargaining power (bargaining
power hypothesis). Moore (1980) similarly treated RTW
status exogenously, but upon finding union wages to be
lower in a right-to-work state, qualified his conclusion by
noting that reverse causality could be present (i.e., states
with less unionization and thus lower wages may be more
likely to pass RTW legislation). Wessels (1981), in using
both exogenous and endogenous treatments, found RTW
status to cause wages to be significantly lower in the former
model, and yet lose its influence on wages in the latter
model. Other research of note in this area would include
Farber, 1984 (both taste and free-rider hypotheses led to
union wage premiums in RTW states); Garofalo and
Malhotra, 1992 (RTW laws had a large, significant, negative
effect on average wages, due to productivity effects);
Hundley, 1993 (no significant effect on union nor nonunion
wages in the public sector); Mishel, 2001 (average wages
were 6-8 percent lower in a RTW state); and Kendrick,
2001, Reed, 2003, and Greer, 2004 (wages tended to be
significantly higher in an RTW state). As previously noted,
theory is mixed as to how RTW laws affect wages (see

Wage Premium Effects
Regarding the union-nonunion wage differential,
research has seemed to indicate a positive relationship
between RTW status and the union wage premium. Farber
(1984) found the premium to be higher in right-to-work
states, basing his analysis upon both the free-rider
hypothesis and the taste hypothesis. Under the former, the
presence of free riders constrains the supply of union jobs,
creating a higher equilibrium price of unionization and a
lower equilibrium extent of unionization. This in turn raises
the equilibrium level of unionization advantage, and
increases the wage premium to the extent that it can be
measured by the union-nonunion wage differential. Under
the taste hypothesis, a decreased perception of union benefits
constrains demand for union representation, while the
relative supply of union jobs remains stable. Such a
scenario, complete with lower equilibrium levels of price
and amount of unionization, implies that for those
employees who do join a union, there must be pecuniary
advantages sufficient to outweigh nonpecuniary
disadvantages, and to the extent this difference can be
measured by a union wage premium, such premium will be
greater in an RTW state. In addition to Farber, Moore
(1980) also studied wage premium effects with much the
same results.
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TABLE 3
Effect of Right-to-Work Laws on Wages
STUDY
Carroll, 1983

EFFECT OF RTW LAW
Negative Effect

Moore, 1980

Negative Effect

Wessels, 1981

Negative Effect (as
exogenous)/No Effect (as
endogenous)
Positive Effect

Farber, 1984
Garofalo & Malhotra,
1992
Hundley, 1993

Negative Effect

Mishel, 2001

Negative Effect

Kendrick, 2001

Positive Effect

Reed, 2003

Positive Effect

Greer, 2004

Positive Effect

No Effect

ANALYSIS
Based on Bargaining
Power Hypothesis
Possibly affected by
reverse causality
Used a measure of job
satisfaction
Based on Taste and FreeRider Hypotheses
Based on Free-Rider
Hypothesis
Focused only on public
sector
Findings dependent on
model used
Affected by higher taxes in
non-RTW states
Controls for state
economic conditions
n/a

view of exit and voice, see Freeman and Medoff, 1984).
The implementation of the utility maximization concept may
prevent oligarchical union tendencies that may exist in the
non-RTW setting and enhance what Crouch terms
“representational rationality” (1982: 170). Where it is
necessary for unions to utilize extra “effort” to attract and
retain members, as seems to be the case in RTW states, a
reasonable expectation is a higher level of union member
satisfaction with their unions when compared to their
counterparts in non-RTW states. By analyzing the principal
determining factors of union satisfaction, an attempt will be
made to examine the dependency of union satisfaction upon
the existence of a right-to-work law.

Miscellaneous Effects
The idea of providing a more valuable service to
convert and hold free riders is developed by Bennett and
Johnson (1980), who base a unique theoretical analysis upon
property rights: Both union “owners” (union members) and
union “managers” (union officers) are assumed to maximize
utility, thereby providing better and more efficient service to
the individual worker in an RTW state than that provided in
a non-RTW state, where the level of utility remains constant
relative to the actions of the two parties. Reid and Faith
(1987) further the concept with their conclusion that unions
in RTW states reward members more currently and more
equally at the expense of seniority (which typically is a
stronger basis for rewards in a non-RTW state). This is done
to counter members’ dissatisfaction which could otherwise
be cured by disaffiliation from the union. Both studies
coincide with Galloway’s theory (1966) that unions have to
“sell’ their services more so in an RTW state than in a nonRTW state due to the fact that the workers are not required
to join the union. In doing so, they make the offer to join
more attractive by trading off employment gains for higher
wage demands.
The studies involving the concept of utility
maximization have important implications for research on
the concept of union satisfaction. The implication that
unions must constantly sell themselves in order to counter
the readily available “exit” option also implies that they
must be more responsive to “voice.” (For a comprehensive

MEASUREMENT OF UNION SATISFACTION
The concept of union satisfaction has been dealt with
empirically in relatively few instances. An extensive study
by Glick, Mirvis and Harder (1977) investigated the
satisfaction of unionized engineers by correlating six
categories of independent measures with a multiple-item
index of overall union satisfaction. The effort found a
relationship between union satisfaction and member
assessment of the quality of the union’s relationship with its
members, as well as member perceptions of the union
leader’s ability to deal with management.
A subsequent study by Fiorito, Gallagher and Fukami
(1988) focused on the concept of satisfaction as a function of
discrepancies between expectations and perceived outcomes,
94

https://scholars.fhsu.edu/jbl/vol6/iss1/10

6

Popejoy: Effects of Right-To-Work Laws: Can They Include Higher Levels of
Popejoy

Journal of Business & Leadership: Research, Practice and Teaching
2010, Vol. 6, 89-98

least as well-off in a right-to-work state where
freedom of individual choice exists than in a nonright-to-work state where it does not (Bennett and
Johnson, 1980).

an approach that serves as the basis of much research in the
field of job satisfaction. Using a model based on overall
union satisfaction and its connection to the above-mentioned
discrepancies in the facets of bread-and-butter issues,
member-union relations issues, and quality of work issues, a
statistically significant relationship was found for the first
two items. The quality of work facet proved to be of little
importance.
A study along similar lines by Jarley, Kuruvilla and
Casteel (1990) and later replicated to a degree by Kuruvilla
and Frenkel (1997) and Frenkel and Kuruvilla (1999)
eschewed a facet discrepancy model of overall union
satisfaction in favor of an instrument which directly
measured satisfaction with union representation in various
areas, to be used as a predictor of the overall level of
satisfaction. In addition to the three areas studied by Fiorito
et al., a fourth area entitled General Attitude Toward Unions
was utilized (based on a supplemental finding in the Fiorito
et al. study). Results of the study largely paralleled the
findings of Fiorito et al., with the exception that quality of
work life proved to be significant in one of the two samples
observed. In both studies, member-union relations proved to
exhibit the greatest effect on overall union satisfaction.

A second argument focuses on the quality of
representation provided by unions. Basing the analysis once
again on utility maximization, it is noted that a union
officer’s pecuniary benefits are fixed, being dependent upon
the number of members in the bargaining unit. In a nonRTW state, an increase in this number (as well as an
increase in the union officer’s pecuniary benefits) can only
occur through an increase in the size of the bargaining unit, a
variable that the officer does not control. However, Bennett
and Johnson (1980) note that a degree of discretion exists
over an officer’s nonpecuniary benefits (defined by the
authors as an amount paid from the difference between
union revenues and operating costs). An officer in this
situation could increase his nonpecuniary benefits by
increasing dues or decreasing operating costs (in the form of
services provided) to an extent that remained politically
prudent. Such behavior would tend to result in the
inefficient provision of union services.
Conversely, in an RTW state (where bargaining unit
size is not fixed), a union officer can increase his pecuniary
and nonpecuniary benefits by inducing nonmembers to join
the union. This could be done by making union membership
more attractive through either a reduction in dues or an
increase in the services provided. It follows that strong
incentives exist for the union officer to keep dues low and to
provide a wide variety of services that appeal to a diverse
group. Additionally, such services must be provided
efficiently, lest increased operating costs force an increase in
dues. Bennett and Johnson (1980) found little empirical
support for the first two prognoses, but did find evidence
that operating costs were lower in RTW states.
Finally, the union-nonunion wage differential will be
cause for increased union satisfaction in an RTW state. As
mentioned previously, Farber (1984) found that under either
the free-rider hypothesis or the taste hypothesis, the unionnonunion wage differential appears to be greater in RTW
states than in non-RTW states. Such can only lead one to
infer that, from a wage standpoint, union members in RTW
states may be more satisfied than their non-RTW
counterparts.

ARGUMENTS FOR A POSITIVE RTW LAW EFFECT
ON UNION SATISFACTION
The results of research on the effects of RTW laws, as
well as research on the measurement of union satisfaction,
seem to suggest a potential relationship between the
existence of an RTW law in a given state and the level of
union satisfaction held by the union workers of that state.
Several arguments have been formulated to support this
proposition. First, one may deliberate the importance of
utility maximization in this scenario. Freedom of choice in
how a worker spends his money is generally associated with
greater utility. Traditional economic theory suggests that a
worker will consume union services to the point of
optimization, a level which is determined by his or her
assessment of the pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits
received per dollar of dues. This situation is found in an
RTW state where, as evidenced by the existence of the free
rider, a worker can make a decision to join a union based
upon how beneficial it will be for him to do so. However, in
a non-RTW state and with a union shop clause, a worker has
no such choice. In this employment,

COUNTERARGUMENTS
…the coerced payment of dues lowers the
discretionary income of the member and, when this
occurs, the maximum level of utility or satisfaction
attained by the member is always less than or, at
best, equal to the maximum level of satisfaction
attainable when the worker is not coerced to
purchase a fixed quantity of union services. [F]rom
the point of view of individual satisfaction, the
bargaining unit member is always better-off or at

Arguments exist that oppose the hypothesis of a positive
union satisfaction-RTW law relation, primarily focusing on
the lack of bargaining power of a union in an RTW state. A
primary argument made by those who oppose RTW laws is
that weakened bargaining power results from the inability to
require universal union membership. As such, expected
benefits resulting from union membership would necessarily
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By providing a framework for analyzing union satisfaction,
national behavioral data bases of union studies may yield
more definitive answers to the age-old question of how
right-to-work laws affect the labor relations process, as well
as the human resource function.

be lower in a RTW state, with concurrently less satisfaction
for union members.
A second argument, alluded to previously, is forwarded
by Warren and Strauss (1979) and is based on the free-rider
theory. It is their view that the existence of free-riders in an
RTW state, by taking advantage of union services and
benefits, will increase the associated costs to the point that
the supply of such services and benefits will be reduced.
Finally, it may be argued that a trade-off exists in an
RTW state between expending limited resources on
bargaining for increased wages and benefits and expending
those resources on organizing costs and other activities long
term in nature. By focusing on the short-term strategy of
attracting nonunion members by negotiating higher
compensation packages, long-term union goals may be
sacrificed along with the long-term satisfaction of its
members.
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